The Minsk II agreements were signed by Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Germany’s Angela Merkel, France’s Francois Hollande and Ukraine’s Petro Poroshenko.
By Dale Street
On the day Russia invaded Ukraine a statement issued by the Stop the War Coalition (STW) called on the British government to “encourage a return to the Minsk 2 agreement, already signed by both sides, by all parties as a basis for ending the crisis in relations between Ukraine and Russia.”
A post-invasion statement issued by the GMB trade union – far better in all other respects than the STW statement – likewise called for “a non-violent solution to this conflict, with a return to the Minsk agreements providing a framework.” And a statement issued in the name of the National Education Union – so wretched that it had to be speedily withdrawn – also called on “all parties to honour their obligations under the Minsk 2 agreement and under international law.”
The Minsk Protocol (Minsk 1) dates from September of 2014. It was forced upon Ukraine under the combined impact of Russian military advances in the east of the country and the pressure of European states. In the summer of 2014 Ukrainian military forces were making slow but steady progress in the conflict with the breakaway Donetsk and Lugansk “People’s Republics”, which had been organised, financed and armed by Russia. With the separatist forces facing defeat, Russia now intervened directly, sending troops and heavy artillery into Ukraine, as well as bombarding Ukrainian border areas from artillery stationed in Russia.
In late August some 400 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in a single day as they attempted to retreat from Russian troops stationed around Ilovaisk. It served as a warning of the carnage which the joint separatist-Russian forces could and would wreak in the event of further fighting.
At the same time, west European states were ready to lean on Ukraine to sign up to some kind of peace deal, restabilising their relations with Putin’s Russia and containing the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
The result was Minsk 1, signed off by representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). By and large, Minsk 1 gave Russia what it wanted. It maintained the fiction that Russia was not directly involved in the conflict but merely a “mediator”. It committed Ukraine to passing a “law on special status” under which power in the “People’s Republics” would remain in the hands of gangster warlords – who were also to be granted immunity from prosecution.
Clause ten of the agreement required the withdrawal of “illegal armed groups, fighters and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine.” But, in reality, this meant nothing. It made no mention of withdrawal of Russian troops (whose presence was denied by Russia anyway). And the People’s Republics” likewise denied that there was anything illegal about their military forces: they supposedly consisted entirely of local “anti-fascist” volunteers.
Worst of all, Minsk 1 allowed the “People’s Republics” to be party to “an inclusive nationwide dialogue”. In practice, this meant that Russia, as the patron of the “People’s Republics”, would have a direct say within Ukraine’s politics. Clause one of Minsk 1 provided for an immediate ceasefire to be monitored by the OSCE. But the fighting continued – and quickly escalated.
In January of 2015 Donetsk “People’s Republic” leader Zakharchenko stated that his puppet state would “not make any attempts at ceasefire talks any more” and would “attack right up to the borders of the Donetsk region.” Backed up by Russian troops, separatist forces seized control of Donetsk Airport after prolonged and bloody fighting in early 2015 and advanced to take control of Debaltseve, a crucial transport hub linking Lugansk and Donetsk.
While the fighting escalated, Russia took steps to create functioning state structures in the “People’s Republics”. New leaderships were imposed, their army and police forces were restructured, fake “elections” were held to provide a veneer of democratic legitimacy, and a Russian inter-ministerial commission took responsibility for their economies.
Ukraine was again forced back to negotiate under pressure of Russian-backed military advances and European states wanting a quick deal.
As Oleksiy Danilov (secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council) later put it: “They (Minsk 2) were signed under the Russian gun barrel — and the German and the French watched.”
According to Ukraine’s Ambassador to Britain, speaking more recently: “These agreements were imposed on us by force by Russia. The most hated word right now in Ukraine is ‘progress’ when it is pronounced in a French or German accent, when we understand that something has to be done at our expense.”
Duncan Allan’s widely quoted analysis of the Minsk agreements says: “The German and French leaders seem to have been so keen for a ceasefire that they assented to political provisions at odds with Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign entity and, probably, its EU integration. This explains why the Kremlin used military power so demonstrably as talks were in session: to intimidate Western interlocutors who, it judged, lacked the stomach for confrontation – and who might be induced to get Ukraine to the fold.”
The academic Samuel Charap adds: “Minsk 2 was a victor’s peace, essentially imposed by Russia on Ukraine at the barrel of a gun. Ukraine’s forces had just been routed, and Germany and France were pushing for an end to the bloodshed.”
Coercing
But Charap’s answer is for the US to take over the role of coercing Ukraine: “Where the US does have significant leverage is with Ukraine. Rather than focusing on coercing Russia, Biden should also push Kiev to take steps towards implementing its obligations under Minsk 2… Biden may also have to push Ukraine to take some painful steps toward compromise in order to save it from calamity.”
Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s aide for Ukraine at the time of Minsk 2, later described the agreement as “the first open geo-political counter-attack by Russia (against the west).” It was part of a reconquest” of Ukraine and “legitimised the first division of Ukraine.”
Looking to the future, Denis Bilous, a member of the Ukrainian socialist organisation Social Movement, has highlighted the circumstances under which Minsk 2 was agreed:
“One of the results of the current (January 2022) standoff will likely be growing pressure on the part of Germany and France to make Zelensky implement the political part of the Minsk agreements – just as they made the previous Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, sign these agreements in 2015.”
Minsk 2 was not an alternative to Minsk 1. It was a continuation of its predecessor – in the wrong direction.
It maintained the fiction that Russia was not party to the conflict and failed to require the withdrawal of their troops. Leaders of the breakaway republics were again guaranteed immunity from prosecution. The armed conflicts which they had initiated as part of the Kremlin’s strategy to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty were simply referred to as “events”. And the creation of a demilitarised buffer zone (specified by clause four of Minsk 1) no longer figured on the agenda.
Ukraine was to adopt a new constitution by the end of 2015. The “law on special status” – a temporary measure under Minsk 1 – was to be incorporated into law and into the new constitution.
Far-reaching powers were to be devolved to the “People’s Republics”. These included the powers to appoint the heads of prosecutors’ offices and courts, to create “people’s militia units”, to promote “cross-border co-operation” between the “People’s Republics” and Russia, and to keep in office local council deputies who had been elected in (sham) “snap elections”.
Minsk 2 benefited Russia in other ways as well. Above all, it failed to specify the sequence in which different clauses should be implemented.
From the outset, this allowed Russia to denounce Ukraine for its supposed failure to implement Minsk 2 (i.e. the Russian version of how it should be implemented).
Russia has claimed that the first stages of implementation should be granting the “People’s Republics” political autonomy and the holding of local elections. In practice, that would mean ‘elections’ under conditions of Russian occupation, with those “elected” effectively having the right of veto over decisions by the Ukrainian parliament, including on whether to join NATO and/or the EU.
Successive Ukrainian government, by contrast, have argued that the first stages of the agreement’s implementation should be the withdrawal of “all foreign armed forces” and restoration of Ukraine’s control over its eastern border with Russia. Only then would free and fair elections be possible.
Like its predecessor, Minsk 2 opened with a clause providing for a ceasefire.
But Putin had other priorities than an immediate end to the fighting. The ceasefire was due to start on 15 February 2015, three days after the agreement had been signed off. The reason for the delay was so that the separatist/Russian forces could complete their seizure of Debaltseve, which they had now encircled. As Putin put it: “Those in the kettle will certainly try to get out; those who have boiled that kettle will try to collect the foam.”
Separatist leaders stated that they had “a moral duty” to capture Debaltseve, and that Minsk 2 “did not apply” to Debaltseve. But Debaltseve had still not been captured by 15 February. The fighting continued, with the town falling on 18 February.
The contempt which the Russian/separatist forces displayed in ignoring the requirement for a ceasefire as of 15 February set the pattern for future years.
Both Ukrainian and Russian/separatist forces have repeatedly breached the ceasefire since then. From 2015 until Russia’s launch of a full-scale war on Ukraine in February 2022, there has been a simmering low-level of military conflict, punctuated by a total of 20 ceasefires Russia did nothing to implement the clause in Minsk 2 requiring the withdrawal of “all foreign armed forces” – unsurprisingly, given its plans for an eventual full-scale invasion.
Russia consistently hindered the work of the OSCE in attempting to monitor implementation of the (nominal) ceasefire and the (nominal) withdrawal of heavy weapons by the “People’s Republics” required by clause two of Minsk 2. After some limited releases of prisoners in the years immediately following Minsk 2 (and a token gesture in April 2020), it has done nothing to implement clause six of Minsk 2: “the release and exchange of hostages and illegally detained persons based on the principle of ‘all for all’.”
It has driven through changes in the “People’s Republics” – the supposed leaders in Donetsk and Lugansk are no more than Moscow’s glove puppets – which amount to a process of creeping integration into Russia. In breach of Minsk 2, elections were held in the “People’s Republics” just two months after the agreement had been signed off. The results, as Bilous has put it, “were not even falsified but simply invented.”
The “People’s Republics” also formally adopted constitutions which claimed sovereignty over areas under Kiev’s control – again, in breach of Minsk 2. Over 800,000 inhabitants of the “People’s Republics” have been issued with Russian passports, i.e. Russian citizenship. Higher education institutions have adopted the curricula used in Russia. The Ukrainian language has been banned in schools. In addition to the replacement of Ukrainian television broadcasting by state-controlled Russian television channels, the Kremlin version of current affairs (and world history, in the form of the “Russian world”) is promoted by outlets of the Russian Centre organisation (Russian-state-funded) and the Russia-Donbass Integration Committee (also Russian-state-funded).
Russian political parties are now active in the “People’s Republics” and contest elections there, especially the Just Russia Party, the Russian Communist Party, and Putin’s United Russia Party. Those inhabitants of the “People’s Republics” who have Russian citizenship also take part in Russian elections. Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 are dead. The former died when Minsk 2 was signed. Minsk 2 itself arguably died the moment it was agreed, because it was never intended by Russia, the force which dictated its terms, to be implemented as a way to resolve the post Maidan conflicts (for which Russia itself bore responsibility).
Or maybe it died on the date when it was due to be implemented, when Russian/ separatist forces blatantly ignored its ceasefire provisions by continuing with their offensive Debaltseve?
Or two months after it had been signed off, when sham elections were held in the “People’s Republics” in breach of the provisions of Minsk 2?
Or some time between February 2015 and February 2022, as the accumulated result of the succession of measures taken by Russia to integrate the “People’s Republics” into Russia?
Or on 21 February this year, when Putin declared Russian recognition of the “People’s Republics” and announced that Minsk 2 was dead: “The Minsk agreements are non-existent now. Why should they be implemented if we recognise the independence of these republics?” Maintaining his record of the previous seven years, in the same speech Putin blamed Ukraine for the collapse of Minsk 2: “They (Ukraine) are not going to implement (Minsk 2). And the top officials have already said it in public. What is to be expected then? Shall we wait for the continuation of sufferings of these people, this genocide of nearly four million people who are living on these territories?” Putin again blamed Ukraine in another speech the following day: “The Minsk agreements were killed long before yesterday’s recognition of the Donbass republics. And not by us, not by these republics, but by Kiev’s current authorities.”
Even if Minsk 2 had not already been dead before Putin’s recognition of the “People’s Republics” as independent states, that declaration killed it off definitively, and with no prospect of revival. As the Kharkov Human Rights Protection Group put it in a statement issued two days after Putin’s act of recognition, on the eve of the invasion: “By ‘recognising’ its proxy republics in the Donbass and openly invading Ukrainian territory [by declaring that it would send troops into the “People’s Republics”], Russia has unilaterally withdrawn from the Minsk Agreement. Since Russia has long used this flawed agreement as a lever of pressure on Ukraine, this is not necessarily a bad thing.”
Even if there had been any space for some faint hope that Putin’s act of recognition did not mark the end for Minsk 2 – although there was no such space – Russia’s invasion three days later further underlined the demise of what was really an already long-dead Minsk 2.
Minsk 2 had required the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Ukraine. But as of 24 February Russia did the opposite. It poured another 150,000 troops into Ukraine.
Minsk 2 was forced on Ukraine by Russian force of arms, with Germany and France acting as Russia’s willing accomplices. Its carefully crafted ambiguities and lack of clarity provided Russia with a pretext to mount a prolonged propaganda war against Ukraine for its failure to implement the agreement in line with Russia’s interpretation of it. Russia ignored its provisions as soon it was signed, and continued to do so for the following seven years. Then, having decided to escalate a long simmering war against Ukraine into full-scale invasion and conquest, Putin dropped any pretence of commitment to implementation of Minsk 2 – while simultaneously blaming Ukraine.
And yet the Stop the War Coalition and its fellow-travellers and camp-followers advocate a “return to Minsk 2, already signed by both sides.” Not even the reference to the agreement having been “already signed by both sides” is particularly accurate: Russia signed Minsk 2 on the claim that it was not one of the sides in the conflict but a mediator, a sort of ACAS with nuclear weapons.
In calling for a return to Minsk 2 the Stop the War Coalition continues to live in a parallel political universe in which NATO is trying to seize Ukraine and the west bears primary responsibility for the Russian invasion. Its “solution” for ending the war is for Ukraine to return to the victor’s peace of seven years ago, one which institutionalised the fiction of Russian non-involvement in the conflict, gave Russia everything it wanted (at that time – now it wants far more), and gave Ukraine nothing.
In his article criticising the position on the war taken by the Democracy in Europe Movement 25 Denis Sultangaliyev writes of how “the Western left continues to shock with their ignorance and disregard (of Ukraine’s rights).”
- This article also appears in the present issue of Solidarity
Shiraz Socialist (Second Run) 